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Risk assessment framework for power control systems
with PMU-based intrusion response system
Jie YAN, Manimaran GOVINDARASU,
Chen-Ching LIU, Ming NI (&), Umesh VAIDYA
Abstract Cyber threats are serious concerns for power
systems. For example, hackers may attack power control
systems via interconnected enterprise networks. This
paper proposes a risk assessment framework to enhance
the resilience of power systems against cyber attacks. The
duality element relative fuzzy evaluation method is
employed to evaluate identified security vulnerabilities
within cyber systems of power systems quantitatively. The
attack graph is used to identify possible intrusion sce-
narios that exploit multiple vulnerabilities. An intrusion
response system (IRS) is developed to monitor the impact
of intrusion scenarios on power system dynamics in real
time. IRS calculates the conditional Lyapunov exponents
(CLEs) on line based on the phasor measurement unit
data. Power system stability is predicted through the val-
ues of CLEs. Control actions based on CLEs will be
suggested if power system instability is likely to happen.
A generic wind farm control system is used for case study.
The effectiveness of IRS is illustrated with the IEEE 39
bus system model.
Keywords Cyber security, Supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA), Risk assessment, Intrusion response
system (IRS), Conditional Lyapunov exponents (CLEs),
Phasor measurement unit (PMU), Voltage instability
1 Introduction
Power systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Modern
IT technologies are heavily used in today’s supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems of industrial
control systems including power systems. While IT tech-
nologies bring a lot of benefits, many security risks are
introduced as well. For example, the connectivity of
SCADA systems and enterprise networks improves busi-
ness visibility and efficiency, but it makes SCADA systems
more vulnerable to cyber attacks. According to the
2003*2006 data from Eric Byres, BCIT, 49 % cyber
attacks at industrial control systems are launched via con-
nected enterprise networks. One highly publicized example
is Stuxnet, which attacked an industrial control system by
infecting those organization networks that interact with the
target [1].
In 2006, US Department of Energy (DOE) published
‘‘Roadmap to secure control systems in the energy sector’’
(updated in 2011) [2]. It envisions that: in 10 years, control
systems for critical applications will be designed, installed,
operated, and maintained to survive an intentional cyber
assault with no loss of any critical function. Much effort
CrossCheck date: 29 January 2015
Received: 17 April 2014 / Accepted: 29 January 2015 / Published
online: 13 August 2015
 The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at
Springerlink.com
J. YAN, Market Engineering, MISO, Carmel, IN 46032, USA
e-mail: jyan@misoenergy.org
M. GOVINDARASU, U. VAIDYA, Department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University, Ames,
IA 50011, USA
M. GOVINDARASU
e-mail: gmani@iastate.edu
U. VAIDYA
e-mail: ugvaidya@iastate.edu
C.-C. LIU, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99165,
USA
e-mail: liu@eecs.wsu.edu
M. NI, NARI Technology Co. Ltd., Nanjing 211106, China
(&) e-mail: mingni2002@hotmail.com
ni-ming@sgepri.sgcc.com.cn
123
J. Mod. Power Syst. Clean Energy (2015) 3(3):321–331
DOI 10.1007/s40565-015-0145-8
has been made to secure power facilities. The DOE
National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) Program, established
in 2003, supports industry and government efforts to
enhance cyber security of control systems in the energy
sector. The NERC standards CIP-002-4 through CIP-009-4
provide a cyber security framework for the identification
and protection of critical cyber assets to support reliable
operations of the bulk electric system [3]. The International
Electrotechnical Commission Technical Council (IEC TC
57), i.e., power system management and associated infor-
mation exchange, has advanced the standard communica-
tion protocol security in IEC 62351 with stronger
encryption and authentication mechanisms [4]. The Hall-
mark Project by Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.
presents the secure SCADA communications protocol
(SSCP) technology which provides integrity for SCADA
messages. United States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team (US-CERT) has set up awareness programs about
system vulnerabilities to improve control system security
[5]. The cyber security audit and attack detection toolkit by
Digital Bond, Inc. is developed to identify vulnerable
configurations in control system devices and applications.
Reference [6] presents a risk assessment methodology that
accounts for both physical and cyber security of critical
infrastructures. In [7], a SCADA security framework is
proposed. System vulnerabilities are assessed quantita-
tively through an attack tree. The impact of a cyber attack
on SCADA systems is studied systematically in [8]. It is
evaluated by the resultant loss of load through a power flow
computation.
This paper presents a new risk assessment framework
for SCADA systems of power grids. Individual vulnera-
bilities within control systems are evaluated based on the
duality element relative fuzzy evaluation method (DER-
FEM). An attack graph is developed to identify possible
intrusion scenarios that exploit multiple security vulnera-
bilities. An intrusion response system (IRS) based on the
phasor measurement unit (PMU) data is proposed to assess
the impact of intrusion scenarios on power system
dynamics.
The main contribution is IRS, which is an on-line
monitoring and control scheme based on PMUs. It moni-
tors the impact of cyber intrusions on power system
dynamics in real time. If power system instability, such as
voltage instability, is judged to be likely after a cyber
attack, IRS will act as a mitigation mechanism to prevent
power system instability. Unlike traditional security
mechanisms, such as encryption and authentication, which
increase the complexity of power systems, and may cost
additional time in power system operations, IRS uses a
control strategy based on the conditional Lyapunov expo-
nents (CLEs) to enhance the resilience of power systems
against cyber attacks.
2 Risk assessment framework
The risk assessment framework is shown in Fig. 1. For
SCADA systems of a power system, the procedure starts
with identification of the configuration of its cyber system.
Vulnerabilities within the cyber system are then identified.
Each vulnerability is evaluated quantitatively by DER-
FEM. An attack graph is built to identify possible intrusion
scenarios that exploit multiple vulnerabilities. The proba-
bility of occurrence of every intrusion scenario is calcu-
lated. Once an intrusion scenario is successfully executed,
IRS will monitor its impact on power system dynamics in
real time. The impact is characterized by CLEs computed
on PMU data. If the values of CLEs are high, it implies that
voltage instability is likely to happen, and then control
actions based on CLEs will be taken to prevent voltage
instability.
2.1 DERFEM
Assume that a cyber system has l identified vulnerabil-
ities: r1, r2rl. DERFEM is employed to assign each vul-
nerability a scaled value within [0, 1] which quantitatively
characterizes the vulnerable level. The larger the scaled
value is, the higher the vulnerable level will be.
DERFEM proceeds as follows.
1) Compare a pair of different vulnerabilities (ri, rj) so
as to obtain the scaled values srjðriÞ and sriðrjÞ. srjðriÞ
represents the vulnerable level of ri compared to rj. Like-
wise, sriðrjÞ represents the vulnerable level of rj compared
to ri. 0 6 srjðriÞ 6 1; 0 6 sriðrjÞ 6 1. If srjðriÞ[ sriðrjÞ, it
implies that the vulnerability ri has a higher vulnerable
level than rj does. srjðriÞ and sriðrjÞ are from engineering
judgments. This method is valid, because engineering
Identify the configuration of a cyber system
Are CLEs
high?
Control
actions
End
Y
N
Identify security vulnerabilities
Formulate an attack graph to
identify intrusion scenarios
Evaluate each vulnerability
by DERFEM
Monitor the impact of intrusion
scenarios on power system
dynamics through IRS
Compute the probability of occurrence
of every intrusion scenario
Fig. 1 Proposed risk assessment framework
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judgments from different sources are statistically close
when it is to compare two vulnerabilities.
2) Continue the comparison of different pairs of indi-
vidual vulnerabilities until a matrix like Table 1 is gener-
ated (sriðriÞ is set to be 1 here for convenience of the
calculation).
3) In each row of Table 1, substitute srjðriÞ with sðri=rjÞ,
where sðri=rjÞ ¼ srjðriÞ=maxðsrjðriÞ; sriðrjÞÞ.
4) Finally, the vulnerable level of ri is quantitatively
characterized by rðriÞ, rðriÞ ¼ minðsðri=r1Þ, sðri=r2Þ;    ;
sðri=rnÞÞ.
DERFEM does not measure the vulnerable level of
certain vulnerability directly, which could be difficult. It
reveals the relatively vulnerable level of the vulnerability
compared to the others.
2.2 Attack graph
In practice, a hacker may have to compromise a couple
of interconnected hosts within a cyber system before he/she
gains access to the control systems. For example, an out-
side intruder has to compromise an enterprise network, and
then attacks its connected industrial control systems via the
enterprise network. This procedure is modeled as an
intrusion scenario in this research. An intrusion scenario is
comprised of several intrusion actions, each action involves
exploiting one security vulnerability.
An attack graph is employed to capture possible intru-
sion scenarios within a cyber system. The attack graph
depicts ways in which a hacker compromises intercon-
nected hosts sequentially by exploiting the corresponding
vulnerabilities so as to achieve a specific goal. The benefits
of the attack graph take into account the effects of inter-
actions of local vulnerabilities and find global security
holes introduced by the interconnections [9].
Basic concepts of the attack graph are defined as
follows.
Definition 1: Subject (ST). Subject is the initiator of
actions. St [ ST can be an attacker or a compromised
device.
Definition 2: node (ND). An electronic device in a cyber
system is a node, using nd ¼ ðidÞ; nd 2 ND to denote. id is
the identifier of the node, and it could be set as an equip-
ment name. If a node is compromised by a subject, the
node itself will become a subject.
Definition 3: privilege (PG). It is used to describe the
operating privilege of a subject in a node. When st [ ST and
nd [ ND, the function PG St; nd
 ! f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5g
expresses the privilege level of st in nd. PGðsti; ndj Þ ¼ 0
implies that subject sti has no access to node n
d
j ; P
Gðsti; ndj Þ ¼
1 indicates that subject sti is able to read the inbound and
outbound messages of node ndj ; P
Gðsti; ndj Þ ¼ 2 means that
subject sti is able to block the inbound and outbound mes-
sages of node ndj ; P
Gðsti; ndj Þ ¼ 3 represents that subject sti
can read and block the inbound and outbound messages of
node ndj ; P
Gðsti; ndj Þ ¼ 4 denotes that Subject sti can send
messages to node ndj ; P
Gðsti; ndj Þ ¼ 5 signifies that subject sti
has the full control access to node ndj .
Definition 4: state (Z). State is a triple z ¼ ðst; nd;
PGðst; ndÞÞ. State is the prerequisite of the next attack
action to be implemented.
Definition 5: interconnection (IC). Interconnection refers
to connections between nodes, using a quadruplet
ic ¼ ðndi ; ndj ;Cij;MijÞ, ic 2 IC, ndi ; ndj 2 ND to denote. Cij
represents the communication channel between ndi and n
d
j .
Cij could be copper wires, optical fibers, wireless, dial-up,
virtual private network (VPN), or digital microwave. Mij is
the type of messages from ndi to n
d
j . Mij could be mea-
surements or control signals. Mij does not necessarily equal
to Mji.
Definition 6: action (A). Action represents the set of
possible actions of the subjects in a cyber system. Action is
a quadruplet a ¼ ðnname; zs; zd; cÞ, a 2 A, zs; zd 2 Z. nname is
the name of an attack action such as the denial-of-service
(DOS) attack or the man-in-the-middle attack; zs and zd
represent the initial and final states of the action; c is the
vulnerability exploited in the action. c is used to denote the
difficult level of action a.
The algorithm to construct an attack graph proceeds as
follows.
1) Identify ND and IC. Develop a directed graph (ND, IC).
The vertex is nd 2 ND, and the edge is ic 2 IC.
2) Identify the node ndk which will be the target of
attacks. ndk could be a SCADA server or a programmable
logic controller (PLC).
3) Determine the goals of attacks—the state of ndk after
being attacked, formulated as follows: zd ¼ ðsti; ndk ;
PGðsti; ndkÞ[ 0), in which sti represents the initial intruding
subject (hackers).
Table 1 Comparison results of the vulnerabilities
Vulnerability Scaled value
r1 r2 r3  rl
r1 1 sr2 ðr1Þ sr3 ðr1Þ  sr1 ðr1Þ
r2 sr1 ðr2Þ 1 sr3 ðr2Þ  sr1 ðr2Þ
r3 sr1 ðr3Þ sr2 ðr3Þ 1  sr1 ðr3Þ
: : : : :
rl sr1 ðrlÞ sr2 ðrlÞ sr3 ðrlÞ  1
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4) Traverse the directed graph (ND, IC). Identify the
node ndk0 that is connected to n
d
k directly. Assume that node
ndk0 has been compromised by s
t
i, and it becomes an
intruding subject, say sti0 .
5) Extract an attack action aimed at ndk from s
t
i0 , such that
a ¼ ðnname; zs; zd; caÞ, zd ¼ ðsti0 ; ndk ;PGðsti0 ; ndkÞ ¼ PGðsti; ndkÞÞ.
ca is the vulnerability of node n
d
k exploited in action a.
6) Establish the prerequisite of action a: zs, formulated
as follows: zs ¼ ðsti; ndk0 ;PGðsti; ndk0 Þ[ 0Þ.
7) Set ndk0 as a new target node, and zs becomes another
zd. Repeat step 4, 5 and 6, until s
t
i0 ¼ sti.
After the attack graph is built, it gives a bird’s-eye view
of possible intrusion scenarios. For each scenario, the
probability of occurrence Pb is calculated as follows.
a) If the intrusion scenario is comprised of two serial
intrusion actions ai and aj, then
Pb ¼ rðcaiÞrðcajÞ ð1Þ
where cai and caj are the local vulnerabilities exploited in
the attack actions ai and aj. Note that P
b is relative as rðcaiÞ
and rðcajÞ are relative. Pb tells how possible an intrusion
scenario is compared to the others.
b) If the intrusion scenario consists of two parallel
intrusion actions ai and aj, then
Pb ¼ r cai
 þ r caj
 
 rðcaiÞrðcajÞ ð2Þ
c) If the intrusion scenario is more complicated, the
calculation of its Pb will be the synthesis of (1) and (2).
2.3 Intrusion response system
The concept of IRS is illustrated in Fig. 2. It is intended
to be an application in the control center of a power system.
The proposed algorithm, which will be discussed in detail
in Section 3, obtains updated power network configurations
from the state estimator (SE), say, every 5 minutes. If an
intrusion scenario is executed successfully, and it results in
disruptions in power system operations such as breaker
opening or loss of generation, such sudden changes of the
power network configurations will be reported to the pro-
posed algorithm through SCADA systems in real time. The
post-attack dynamical model of the power system is then
built. After that, the algorithm extracts synchronized pha-
sor measurements from the PMU data concentrator, which
obtains real time PMU data from substations equipped with
PMUs. A number of the state variables of the dynamical
model are observed from PMU data. Based on the
dynamical model and PMU measurements, CLEs are cal-
culated to monitor the impact of the intrusion on power
system dynamics.
If CLEs have only low values, the prediction is that
voltage instability will not happen; otherwise, voltage
instability is likely to occur, and the proposed algorithm
will send proper control signals to the energy management
system (EMS) to prevent voltage instability.
3 Proposed algorithm
3.1 Dynamical model
In this algorithm, generators are represented by classical
models, and loads are represented by ZIP models. After a
cyber intrusion, the dynamical model of a power system is
established as shown below:
Ybus _V ¼ _I
 _Vi _Ii ¼ PD;i þ jQD;i
_Vj _I

j ¼ _Vj Xj\dj
_Vj
Zj
 
8
><
>:
ð3Þ
ddj
dt
¼ xj
2Hj
xRe
dxj
dt
þ OjxRe xj ¼ Pm;j  ReððXj\djÞ _Ij Þ
(
ð4Þ
where i = 1, 2,, n - m; j = n – m ? 1, n – m ? 2,, n;
n is the total number of buses; m is the total number of
generators; PD,i ? jQD,i is the power consumption at
PMU
PMU
PMU
GPS satellite Communication links
...
Data concentrator
State estimator
Real-time data
server
Ethernet
Proposed algorithm
Control center
EMS
Fig. 2 Concept of IRS
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load bus i; PD;i ¼ P0;i Ai þ Bi Vij j
V0;ij j
 
þ Ci Vij j
V0;ij j
 2" #
1þ LP;iDf
 
; QD;i ¼ Q0;i Di þ Ei Vij j
V0;ij j
 
þ Fi Vij j
V0;ij j
 2" #
1þ LQ;iDf
 
; Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Ei, Fi, LP,i, and LQ,i are load
parameters; P0,i ? jQ0,i is the steady-state power con-
sumption; V0,i is the steady-state voltage; Df is the fre-
quency deviation in p.u.; Hj and Oj are generator inertias; dj
is the rotor angle of generator j; xj is the angular speed of
generator j; xRe is the reference speed; Xj is the internal
voltage magnitude at generator j; Zj is the impedance
between generator j and its generator bus; Pm,j is the
mechanical power input to generator j.
Excitation systems of the generators are assumed to
function in some way to keep internal voltage magnitudes
at reference values during the transient period. The time
constant of modern excitation systems is less than 0.5 s. If a
new reference value is issued to an excitation system, the
corresponding voltage magnitude will change rapidly due
to the fast response of the excitation system. CLEs will be
computed based on an updated dynamical model to reas-
sess system stability.
Let x denote V1j j;\V1; V2j j;\V2;    ; Vnj j;\Vn½ T, and y
denote d1;x1;    ; dm;xm½ T. Equations (3) and (4) are
represented by:
G x; yð Þ ¼ 0 ð5Þ
dy
dt
¼ F x; yð Þ ð6Þ
Since
dG x; yð Þ
dt
¼ 0 ¼ Gx dx
dt
þ Gy dy
dt
ð7Þ
It is obtained that:
dx
dt
¼  Gxð Þ1Gy dy
dt
¼  Gxð Þ1GyF x; yð Þ ð8Þ
where Gx and Gy are the Jacobian matrixs of G with respect
to x and y.
When det(Gx) = 0 and Gy
dy
dt
6¼ 0, dx
dt
has very large
values. Correspondingly, x will change dramatically, and
voltage instability is likely to happen.
3.2 Methodology: CLEs
The notion of CLEs (originally called sub-Lyapunov
exponents) is introduced by Pecora and Carroll in their
study of synchronization of chaotic systems [10] and [11].
Similar to the full Lyapunov exponents, CLEs are well
defined ergodic invariants.
Consider a N-dimensional continuous-time dynamical
system dz
dt
¼ HðzÞ. Split the state vector z into two vectors:
z1 2 RK , and z2 2 RNK (0\K\N), one will obtain two
sub systems: dz1
dt
¼ H1ðz1; z2Þ and dz2dt ¼ H2ðz1; z2Þ. Let
z1 tð Þ ¼ uðt; v1; v2Þ be the solution of the first sub system at
time t starting from the initial conditions z01 ¼ v1, z02 ¼ v2.
The CLEs Ci for the sub system
dz1
dt
¼ H1ðz1; z2Þ are defined
as eigenvalues of the following limiting.
Kðv1Þ ¼ lim
t!1½K
Tðt; v1; v2ÞKðt; v1; v2Þ
1
2t ð9Þ
Ciðv1Þ ¼ lnðkiðv1ÞÞ ð10Þ
where i = 1, 2,, K; K(t, v1, v2) is the Jacobian matrix of
u(t, v1, v2) with respect to v1; kiðv1Þ is the ith eigenvalue of
Kðv1Þ. The existence of CLEs is guaranteed under the same
conditions that establish the existence of the Lyapunov
exponents [12].
The relationship between CLEs and system stability is
discussed in the following. In ergodic theory of dynamical
systems, the Lyapunov exponents are used to characterize
the exponential divergence or convergence of nearby
trajectories, as shown in Fig. 3. For the sub system
dz1
dt
¼ H1ðz1; z2Þ, its maximal conditional Lyapunov expo-
nent (MCLE) MMCLE determines the exponential conver-
gence of nearby system trajectories. This is true due to the
approximation of
Dz1ðtÞk k  eMMCLEt Dz01
  ð11Þ
If dz1
dt
has very large values, the nearby system
trajectories will diverge. Correspondingly, MMCLE  0.
Otherwise, the nearby trajectories will converge, and
MCLE has a low or even negative value. Therefore, the
value of MCLE reveals the magnitude of time derivatives
of related state variables. When the state variables are
0
1z
0
1Δz
1( )tz
1( )tΔz
Fig. 3 Nearby trajectories in the state space
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voltages of a power system, MCLE can be used to monitor
the magnitude of time derivatives of the voltages, and
hence voltage stability.
In this work, the dynamical system in (8) is split into n
sub systems. The ith sub system has the state variables
Vij j;\Vi½ T, where i = 1, 2,, n. MCLE is computed for
each sub system to monitor voltage stability within it.
Let Gy
dy
dt
¼ U 2 R2n, one may obtain
U2i1 ¼ Vij jXi cos \ ViþZidið Þð ÞZij j ddidt
þQ0;i Di þ Ei Vij j
V0;ij j
 
þ Fi Vij j
V0;ij j
 2" #
LQ;i
dDf
dt
U2i ¼  Vij jXi sin \ ViþZidið Þð ÞZij j
ddi
dt
þP0;i Ai þ Bi Vij j
V0;ij j
 
þ Ci Vij j
V0;ij j
 2" #
LP;i
dDf
dt
8
>>>>><
>>>>>>:
ð12Þ
where i = 1,2,…,n. Xi = 0, |Zi| = ?, and di = 0 if there
is no generator at bus i.
As dDf
dt
is small,
U2i1  Vij jXi cos \ Vi þ Zi  dið Þð Þ
Zij j xi
U2i   Vij jXi sin \ Vi þ Zi  dið Þð Þ
Zij j xi
8
><
>>:
ð13Þ
One can assume that Gx is diagonal in computation
without compromising the accuracy, and then the ith sub
system of (8) is represented by:
d Vij j
dt
¼  U2i1
Gxð2i 1; 2i 1Þ
d\Vi
dt
¼  U2i
Gxð2i; 2iÞ
ð14Þ
where i = 1, 2,…,n; Gx(2i - 1, 2i - 1) is the element at
row 2i - 1 and column 2i - 1 of Gx. It is noted that
d Vij j
dt
¼
d\Vi
dt
¼ 0 if there is no generator at bus i, which is reason-
able since the change of the voltages at load buses is driven
by the voltages at generator buses. Consequently,
d Vij j
dt
and
d\Vi
dt
do not depend on |Vi| and \Vi.
The proposed algorithm calculates MCLEs of the sub
systems that have generators at the corresponding buses.
The computation method is introduced in the following.
3.3 Computation method
MCLEs are calculated over a limited time window. PMU
measurements are extracted to observe time-varying values
of the state variables of the sub systems. The unobservable
part of the state variables is approximated through the
implicit integration method with trapezoidal rule [13]. At
the same time, the observable part is estimated by the same
method as a backup of PMU data. If a PMU is compromised,
it will be detected by comparing the PMU data and the
corresponding estimation results. The estimation results will
be used in the MCLE calculation. The algorithm in [13], the
standard method with Gram-Schmidt reorthonormalization
(GSR), is then used to compute MCLEs. If the values of
MCLEs are over a predefined limit, it is predicted that
voltage instability will happen. Control signals will be sent
to EMS to prevent the voltage instability.
Selection of the length of the time interval could be
arbitrary. Study shows that MCLEs exhibit robustness to
the length of the time interval: MCLEs computed over
different length time intervals all have very high values if
voltage instability is going to happen. In this research, the
time interval length is set to be 0.2 s, so that it is short
while it has enough PMU measurements.
3.4 Control actions
When the value of MCLE of a sub system is over a
predefined limit, the proposed algorithm will send a control
signal to the excitation system of the generator related to
the sub system through EMS. The reference value of the
generator internal voltage magnitude is modified as
follows:
X
ref;new
Gen ¼ 1þ
MMCLE
Cconst
 
X
ref;old
Gen ð15Þ
where Cconst is a predefined constant value. Voltage
instability can be prevented with the fast response of the
exciting system.
4 Case study
Wind farm SCADA systems are selected for case study
due to the fact that wind power is a fast-emerging renew-
able resource on power grids, and it has the potential to
affect the dynamical performance of power systems.
4.1 Wind farm SCADA systems
The generic network configuration of wind farm
SCADA systems is identified and shown in Fig. 4. Every
wind turbine is equipped with a wind turbine control panel
(WTCP), which monitors and controls the wind turbine.
WTCP is normally mounted in the tower base and is easily
accessible. Through WTCPs, servers in a control room
support monitoring and control of the wind turbines within
a wind farm. However the control room is normally not
326 Jie YAN et al.
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staffed and it is only for maintenance occasions. Wind
farms in separate locations are integrated into a single EMS
in a main control center through a control wide area net-
work (WAN). In the control center, system analysts over-
see every turbine at the wind farms. The control center
interfaces restrictively with corporate networks for busi-
ness and operational reasons.
Vulnerabilities are identified in [14], including config-
uration management of WTCPs (r1), implicit trust between
WTCPs and a control room (r2), implicit trust between
control rooms and a control center (r3), wireless network
(r4), optical fibers (r5), virtual private network (r6), digital
microwave (r7), poor access control within a control room
(r8), poor access control within a control center (r9), bad
configuration of remote access (r10), weak firewall policy
(r11), and human errors (r12).
The vulnerabilities are evaluated through DERFEM.
The results are shown in Table 2. An attack graph is built
as shown in Fig. 5. Nine possible intrusion scenarios are
identified, and the probability of occurrence of every sce-
nario is calculated, as shown in Table 3.
The intrusion scenarios show that, if successfully exe-
cuted, a hacker will gain some levels of control access to
several or even hundreds of WTCPs. The output of com-
promised wind farms will be maliciously manipulated. The
impact on power system dynamics is studied next.
In Fig. 5, z1 = (hacker, WTCP, 5); z2 = (hacker,
WTCP, 0); z3 = (hacker, WTCPs in a wind farm, 2);
z4 = (hacker, WTCPs in a wind farm, 0); z5 = (hacker,
WTCPs in a wind farm, 1); z6 = (hacker, WTCPs in a wind
farm, 4); z7 = (hacker, SCADA server in the control room,
3); z8 = (hacker, SCADA server in the control room, 0);
z9 = (hacker, SCADA server in the control room, 4);
z10 = (hacker, SCADA server in the control center, 2);
z11 = (hacker, SCADA server in the control center, 0);
z12 = (hacker, SCADA server in the control room, 5);
z13 = (hacker, workstation in the control room, 5);
z14 = (hacker, workstation in the control room, 0);
z15 = (hacker, SCADA server in the control center, 5);
z16 = (hacker, workstation in the control center, 5);
z17 = (hacker, workstation in the control center, 0);
z18 = (hacker, workstation in the corporate LAN, 5);
z19 = (hacker, workstation in the corporate LAN, 0);
z20 = (hacker, remote access point, 5); z21 = (hacker,
remote access point, 0); a1 = (password cracking, z2, z1,
r1); a2 = (jamming, z4, z3, r4); a3 = (passive tapping, z4,
z5, r5); a4 = (man-in-the-middle attack, z7, z6, r2);
a5 = (active tapping, z8, z7, r5); a6 = (spoof, z9, z6, r2);
a7 = (spoof, z10, z9, r3); a8 = (DOS attack, z11, z10, r6);
a9 = (jamming, z11, z10, r7); a10 = (spoof, z12, z6, r2);
a11 = (internal attack, z8, z12, r12); a12 = (malware infec-
tion, z13, z12, r8); a13 = (infected portable storage device
attack, z14, z13, r12); a14 = (malware infection, z15, z12, r3);
a15 = (malware infection, z16, z15, r9); a16 = (infected
portable storage device attack, z17, z16, r12); a17 = (mal-
ware infection, z18, z16, r11); a18 = (infected portable
storage device attack, z19, z18, r12); a19 = (phishing, z19,
z18, r12); a20 = (malware infection, z20, z18, r10);
a21 = (infected portable storage device attack, z21, z20,
r12); a22 = (phishing, z21, z20, r12).
4.2 Simulation results
The IEEE 39 bus system [15] shown in Fig. 6 is used for
simulations. Generator G5 and G9 (marked with two
rectangles) are replaced by two wind farms comprised of
hundreds of variable speed wind turbines utilizing the
doubly-fed induction generators (DFIGs). The rating of
each wind turbine is 2.0 MW. From the system point of
view, the wind farms are considered as constant negative
loads during the transient period, due to the fast control
capacity of the power electronic technology within wind
turbines. The other generators are classically modeled and
the loads are represented by ZIP models.
MCLEs are calculated for the generator buses (except
G5 and G9) by the proposed algorithm every 0.2 s to
monitor power system stability. Assume that at t = 0.4 s, a
hacker maliciously manipulates the power output of G5 (or
G9) to some extent. Part of the simulation results is shown
in Table 4.
The explains of Table 4 are as following.
WTCP
WT1
...
SCADA
server
Workstation Data
storage
Control room
Ethernet
Application
server
Control WAN
SCADA
server
Workstation Data
storage
Router Redundant LAN
Firewall
Application
server
Main Control Center
Router
Firewall
Corporate LAN
View node
Firewall
Engineering
Communication
links
Remote
access
WTCP
WT2
WTCP
WTx
Fig. 4 Generic network configuration of wind farm SCADA systems
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Attack 1: PGen of G5 is reduced by 10 MW. Attack 2:
QGen of G5 is reduced by 10 Mvar. Attack 3: PGen of G5 is
reduced by 100 MW. Attack 4: QGen of G5 is reduced by
100 Mvar. Attack 5: PGen of G9 is reduced by 10 MW.
Attack 6: QGen of G9 is reduced by 7.5 Mvar. Attack 7:
PGen of G9 is reduced by 100 MW. Attack 8: QGen of G9 is
reduced by 75 Mvar. Attack 9: PGen of G5 is reduced by
half. Attack 10: QGen of G5 is reduced by half. Attack 11:
QGen of G5 is reduced to -QGen. Attack 12: PGen of G9 is
reduced by half. Attack 13: PGen of G5 is reduced by half.
QGen of G5 is reduced by half. PGen of G9 is reduced by
half. Attack 14: PGen of G5 is reduced by 30 MW. QGen of
G5 is reduced by15 Mvar. PGen of G9 is reduced by 50
MW. QGen of G9 is reduced by 10 Mvar.
The simulation results come to the following
conclusions.
1) The values of MCLEs are close to 0, when the power
system is in the steady state.
2) Upon an attack, the values of MCLEs oscillate as
time evolves, but have limited values if voltage instability
is not likely to happen. During Attack 2, the reactive power
output of G5 is reduced by 10 Mvar at t = 0.4 s. MCLEs
increase for a while, and then decrease, as shown in
Fig. 7a. The values are below 200.
3) The values of MCLEs constantly increase as time
evolves, if voltage instability is likely to happen within the
power system. During Attack 10, the reactive power output
of G5 is reduced by half at t = 0.4 s. Voltage instability
happens at t = 1.42 s, as shown in Fig. 7b. The values of
MCLEs keep increasing after the attack, as shown in
Fig. 7c.
Table 2 Results of DERFEM
Vulnerability r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10 r11 r12 r(r2)
r1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0
r2 0.6 1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.75
r3 0.4 0.6 1 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.50
r4 0.5 0.4 0.6 1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5714
r5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.50
r6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.25
r7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.125
r8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.625
r9 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.25
r10 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.6667
r11 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5
r12 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.375
z1 z2
z3
z4
z5
z6
z7 z8
z9 z10 z11
a4
a6
a2
a3
a5
a7
a8
a9
a1
z12
a10 a11
z13
a12
z14
a13
z15
a14
z16
a15 z17
a16
z18
a17
z19
a18
a19
z20
a20
z21
a21
a22
Fig. 5 Constructed attack graph
Table 3 Intrusion scenarios and probabilities
Intrusion scenario Pb
a1 1
a2 0.5714
a3 0.5
a5 ? a4 or a11 ? a10 0.5508
a8 (or a9) ? a7 ? a6 0.1289
a13 ? a12 ? a10 0.1758
a16 ? a15 ? a14 ? a10 0.0352
a18 (or a19) ? a17 ? a15 ? a14 ? a10 0.0176
a21 (or a22) ? a20 ? a17 ? a15 ? a14 ? a10 0.0117
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4) Voltage instability is likely to occur around the
generator buses where MCLEs have high values. Take
Attack 10 as an example, MCLEs of G2, G3, G4, G6 and
G7 (circled in Fig. 6) are over 1000 at t = 1.4 s. Time-
domain simulation results show that voltage instability
happens around those generator buses. It is reasonable as
G2, G3, G4, G6 and G7 are close to G5.
Based on the simulation results, a predefined limit for
the values of MCLEs is set to be 800. If the value of MCLE
of a generator bus exceeds the limit, it is predicted that
voltage instability will happen around the generator bus.
Control signal
X
ref;new
Gen ¼ 1þ
MMCLE
10000
 
X
ref;old
Gen ð15Þ
will be sent to the excitation system of the related gen-
erator. Simulation results show that voltage instability can
be avoided. For example, during Attack 10, MCLEs of
G3, G4, G6 and G7 are over 800 at t = 1.2 s. The cor-
responding control signals are then sent to G3, G4, G6
and G7. Voltage instability is prevented, as shown in
Fig. 7d.
5 Conclusion
A risk assessment framework with a PMU-based IRS is
proposed for power control systems. The main idea of IRS
is to calculate MCLEs for generator buses in order to
monitor voltage stability. The higher values MCLEs have,
the more likely voltage instability occur around the cor-
responding generator buses. MCLE method is based on a
solid analytical foundation and it is validated by simulation
results.
This research leads to significant contributions to the
development of a more reliable and secure power grid.
Future research includes the following aspects.
1) For a large cyber system with numerous security
vulnerabilities, DERFEM may not be sufficient. Some
statistical analysis techniques may be coupled with DER-
FEM to improve evaluation results.
2) A dedicated control strategy will be developed in IRS
for control actions to prevent voltage instability. The
voltages are over 1.2 after 1.8 s in Fig. 7d. It is because IRS
employs a control action on a simplified excitation system.
The dedicated control strategy will be studied with full-
scale excitation systems.
Fig. 6 IEEE 10 generator 39 bus system
Table 4 MCLE of bus G3
Attack MCLE Voltage
instability
0*0.2 s 0.2*0.4 s 0.4*0.6 s 0.6*0.8 s 0.8*1 s 1*1.2 s 1.2*1.4 s 1.4*1.6s 1.6*1.8 s
1 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 9.88 9 10-1 2.77 3.84 3.69 2.96 3.55 7.29 N/A
2 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 7.25 2.81 9 10 6.23 9 10 1.14 9 102 1.90 9 102 1.83 9 102 6.98 9 10 N/A
3 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 6.90 9 10 2.11 9 102 3.94 9 102 6.83 9 102 1.22 9 103 t = 1.57 s
4 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 1.17 9 102 4.08 9 102 9.12 9 102 1.98 9 103 t = 1.20 s
5 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 -1.01 -2.27 -3.16 -4.08 -4.58 -4.23 -2.78 N/A
6 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 6.04 2.21 9 10 4.65 9 10 8.18 9 10 1.32 9 102 1.09 9 102 4.81 N/A
7 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 3.45 9 10 1.05 9 102 2.00 9 102 3.51 9 102 6.12 9 102 1.10 9 103 2.17 9 103 t = 1.86 s
8 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 1.05 9 102 3.48 9 102 7.27 9 102 1.43 9 103 t = 1.24 s
9 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 2.31 9 102 7.65 9 102 1.72 9 103 t = 1.03 s
10 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 7.12 9 10 2.45 9 102 5.27 9 102 1.03 9 103 2.05 9 103 t = 1.42 s
11 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 3.55 9 102 1.37 9 103 t = 0.8 s
12 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 2.91 9 102 1.03 9 103 2.72 9 103 t = 1.06 s
13 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 8.33 9 102 t = 0.76 s
14 -2.77 9 10-3 -2.62 9 10-2 6.43 9 10 2.07 9 102 4.10 9 102 7.47 9 102 1.38 9 103 t = 1.56 s
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3) IRS is not only able to monitor voltage stability under
cyber intrusions, but also can be used to monitor voltage
stability after disturbances. It is promising to integrate IRS
and the on-line monitor scheme in [13], so that a control
center can monitor both voltage dynamics and rotor angle
dynamics.
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creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
[1] Falliere N, Murchu LO, Chien E (2011) W32.stuxnet dossier.
Symantec, Cupertino
[2] Roadmap to secure control systems in the energy sector. http://
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/roadmap.
pdf#search=‘Roadmap?to?Secure?Control?Systems?in?the?
Energy?Sector‘
[3] Standards. http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/default.aspx
[4] Cleveland F (2006) IEC TC57 security standards for the power
system’s information infrastructure—Beyond simple encryption.
In: Proceedings of the 2005/2006 IEEE PES transmission and
distribution conference and exhibition, Dallas, 21–24 May 2006,
pp 1079–1087
[5] Sheldon F, Batsell S, Prowell S et al (2005) Control systems
cybersecurity awareness. United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT), Washington, DC
[6] Depoy J, Phelan J, Sholander P et al (2005) Risk assessment for
physical and cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures. In: Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE military communications conference
(MILCOM’05), vol 3, Atlantic City, 17–20 Oct 2005,
pp 1961–1969
[7] Ten CW, Maninaran G, Liu CC (2010) Cybersecurity for critical
infrastructures: attack and defense modeling. IEEE Trans Syst
Man Cybern A 40(4):853–865
[8] Ten CW, Liu CC, Maninaran G (2008) Vulnerability assessment
of cybersecurity for SCADA systems. IEEE Trans Power Syst
23(4):1836–1846
[9] Sheyner OM (2004) Scenario graphs and attack graphs. Ph D
Thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh
[10] Pecora LM, Carroll TL (1990) Synchronization in chaotic sys-
tems. Phys Rev Lett 64:821–824
[11] Pecora LM, Carroll TL (1991) Driving systems with chaotic
signals. Phys Rev A 44(4):2374–2385
[12] Vilela-Mendes R (1998) Conditional exponents, entropies and a
measure of dynamical self-organization. Phys Rev A 248(2/3/
4):167–171
[13] Yan J, Liu CC, Vaidya U (2011) PMU-based monitoring of rotor
angle dynamics. IEEE Trans Power Syst 26(4):2125–2133
[14] Yan J, Liu CC, Govindarasu M (2011) Cyber intrusion of wind
farm SCADA system and its impact analysis. In: Proceedings of
the 2011 IEEE PES power systems conference and exposition,
Phoenix, 20–23 Mar 2011, 6 pp
[15] IEEE 10 generator 39 bus system. http://sys.elec.kitami-it.ac.jp/
ueda/demo/WebPF/39-New-England.pdf
Jie YAN received his Ph.D. degree from Iowa State University. He is
currently a market engineer in MISO.
Manimaran GOVINDARASU received the Ph.D. degree in com-
puter science and engineering from the Indian Institute of Technol-
ogy, Madras, India, in 1998. He is currently an associate professor
with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa
State University (ISU). His research expertise is in the areas of
resource management in real-time systems and networks, overlay
networks, network security, and their applications to critical infras-
tructures such as the electric grid. He has published over 100 peer-
reviewed research publications. He is the coauthor of the book
Fig. 7 Simulation results
330 Jie YAN et al.
123
entitled Resource Management in Real-Time Systems and Networks
(MIT Press, 2001). He received the Young Engineering Research
Faculty Award at ISU in 2003. He has given tutorials on Internet
infrastructure security in conferences, such as the IEEE Infocom 2004
and IEEE ComSoc Tutorials Now (2004), and served as Workshop
Cochair, Symposium Cochair, and Session Chair on many occasions.
Chen-Ching LIU received his Ph.D. degree from the University of
California, Berkeley. He is currently the Boeing distinguished
professor of the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science at Washington State University, and a professor of power
systems at University College Dublin, Ireland as well. During 2006 to
2008, he was palmer chair professor of electrical and computer
engineering at Iowa State University. Prior to joining ISU, he was a
professor of electrical engineering at the University of Washington,
Seattle. He received the IEEE PES Outstanding Power Engineering
Educator Award in 2004. He served as Chair of the Technical
Committee on Power System Analysis, Computing, and Economics,
IEEE Power and Energy Society, during 2005 to 2006.
Ming NI received his B.S. and Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering
in 1991 and 1996 respectively, from Southeast University of China.
He is now the special expert in NARI Technology Co. Ltd. His main
research interest include mutual-impact between ICT and power
system. Before joining Technology Co. Ltd. in 2012, he was the
manager of economic studies in MISO, Minnesota, USA.
Umesh VAIDYA received the Ph.D. degree in mechanical engineer-
ing from the University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara,
in 2004. He was a research engineer at the United Technologies
Research Center (UTRC), East Hartford, CT. He is currently an
assistant professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, Iowa State University. His research interests include
dynamical systems and control theory, in particular analysis and
control of nonequilibrium behavior in nonlinear systems and appli-
cation of ergodic theory methods to control problems.
Risk assessment framework for power control systems with PMU-based intrusion response system 331
123
